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Abstract
Agents interacting on a body of water choose between technologies
to catch sh. One is harmless to the resource, as it allows full recovery;
the other yields high immediate catches, but low(er) future catches.
Strategic interaction in one objectiveresource game may induce
several subjective games in the class of social dilemmas. Which
unique subjectivegame is actually played depends crucially on how
the agents discount their future payo¤s. We examine equilibrium be-
havior and its consequences on sustainability of the common-pool re-
source system under exponential and hyperbolic discounting.
A su¢ cient degree of patience on behalf of the agents may lead
to equilibrium behavior averting exhaustion of the resource, though
full restraint (both agents choosing the ecologically or environmentally
sound technology) is not necessarily achieved. Furthermore, if the
degree of patience between agents is su¢ ciently dissimilar, the more
patient is exploited by the less patient one in equilibrium.
We demonstrate the generalizability of our approach developed
throughout the paper. We provide recommendations to reduce the
enormous complexity surrounding the general cases.
JEL codes: C72, C73, Q22, Q57.
Keywords: stochastic renewable resource games, hyperbolic & expo-
nential discounting, social dilemmas, sustainability.
1 Introduction
The central theme of this paper is the e¤ect of time preferences in a commons
problem on the adoption of a technology. To be more specic, the resource
problem investigated is that of a Small Fish War (Joosten [2007a,b,c]) to
be characterized as follows.1 Several agents possess the shing rights to a
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1A word play on Levhari & Mirman [1980] who show that strategic interaction in a
shery may induce a tragedy of the commons(Hardin [1968]).
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body of water, and they have essentially two options, to sh with or with-
out restraint. Restraintin practice may take various forms, e.g., regarding
catching seasons, quantities caught, catching methods, technologies, e.g.,
boats, nets, allowed in catching. Unrestrained shing yields a higher imme-
diate catch, but it may lead to a decreasing sh stock and hence, decreasing
future catches in the long run. Restrained shing by both agents is assumed
to be sustainable.
In a standardSmall Fish War agents maximize their average catches
over an innite time-horizon. In such a setting, a tragedy of the commons2
does not seem inevitable, as Pareto-e¢ cient outcomes can be sustained by
subgame perfect equilibria. In a wide range of the parameter space of the
model, the more the catches deteriorate due to over-shing, the greater the
gap between Pareto-e¢ cient outcomes and the never restraintoutcome, but
the smaller the gap between the former and the perfect restraintoutcome.
The choice of a technology by two agents takes place at the start of
the game and can not be undone for a su¢ ciently long period of time.
For the sake of simplicity, each agent can choose between two alternative
technologies and has to consider the following. One technology yields a
higher immediate payo¤ but damages the resource; the alternative yields a
lower immediate payo¤ but allows the resource to recover completely. We
assume that the use of the harmful technology by both agents damages the
sh stock su¢ ciently such that long-term catches deteriorate to a level below
the full-restraint level.
By focussing analysis on technology choice between an environmentally
neutral and a detrimental one, we can show links to and make comparisons
with contributions in the social dilemma literature, cf., e.g., Komorita &
Parks [1994], Heckathorn [1996], Marwell & Oliver [1993]. The resource
game is to be associated primarily with a social trap3, see e.g., Platt [1973],
Cross & Guyer [1980] and the closely related tragedy of the commonscf.,
e.g., Hardin [1968], Messick et al. [1983], Messick & Brewer [1983]).
The modelling and analysis of social traps involves time in a non trivial
manner. First, current (past) actions have an inuence on future (present)
stage payo¤s. To be a little bit more specic, a social trap is a situation
in which a certain action always induces a higher immediate stage payo¤
regardless of what the other agents do, but the continued playing of this
dominant action in the stage games leads to considerably lower future stage
payo¤s on all actions. Furthermore, it matters how much agents care about
the future. Very myopicagents only care about the present payo¤s, hence
they are very likely to choose the action yielding the immediate advantage.
As in more traditional Small Fish Wars (e.g., Joosten [2007a,b,c]) a
2Term is due to Hardin [1968], yet the underlying problem it was already recognized
in antiquity. An earlier classic, related to the present context, is Gordon [1954].
3Called a take somegame by Hamburger [1973] who also introduces give somegames.
A well-known example of latter is a public good game.
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continued use of the ecologically damaging technology by both agents, the
long-term catches deteriorate below the level of the catches under perfect
restraint. Furthermore, we specify what occurs in the long run if one agent
chooses restraint and the other one chooses the environmentally damaging
technology. This covers the rst non-trivial inuence of time as mentioned,
all aspects here are objective, in the sense that one can actually measure
the e¤ects of the agentschoices.
The next point of focus is the way the agents care about the future, i.e.,
evaluate their streams of future catches at the moment of the technology
adoption decision. First, we examine the game under the assumption that
the players use exponential discounting to evaluate their innite streams of
stage payo¤s. For this evaluation criterion every unit of payo¤s K periods
removed in the future from any point t in the future receives weight K 1;
 2 [0; 1), times the weight of the same unit of payo¤s receives in period t
(cf., e.g., Samuelson [1937]). Following standard interpretations, e.g., Koop-
mans [1960], we say that an agent is more patient for higher values of :
Second, we examine the game under the assumption that the players use
hyperbolic discounting (e.g., Phelps & Pollack [1968]), i.e., every unit of
payo¤s t periods removed in the future is evaluated at 11+Dt ; D  0; times
an immediate payo¤ of one unit. Here, an agent is said to be more patient
for smaller D; as for smaller values future payo¤s receive more weight.
For expository purposes we examine a particular Small Fish War ex-
tensively for the possible e¤ects of discounting under di¤erent degrees of
patience distinguishing four di¤erent ranges. Very impatient agents play a
game in which it is benecial for both to choose the ecologically harmful
technology as this strategy is the dominant action and the associated re-
wards are the next-to-highest available. Less impatient agents are involved
in a PrisonersDilemma, with the usual problem that the Nash equilibrium,
i.e., mutual no-restraint, yields a lower reward than the ones associated with
full restraint. Both situations, i.e., a pair of very impatient agents and a
pair of impatient agents, induce games in which it is rational to exploit the
resource ruthlessly. Moderately patient agents are involved in a so-called
Chicken Game which has two asymmetric pure Nash equilibria. In either
equilibrium one agent chooses restraint, the other chooses no restraint. The
long term sh stock will be considerably higher than if both choose no-
restraint, yet lower than if both were to choose restraint. Patient agents
induce a so-called Privileged Game, i.e., both agents choose restraint and
this equilibrium gives to each player the most preferred reward of all rewards
possible, meanwhile the resource remains at full capacity.
In the preceding paragraph, we presented the results for the four di¤erent
ranges of patience, assuming that both agents belong to the same category.
We have also performed the same analysis for players belonging to di¤erent
regions of patience. The total number of games is six, given the four possible
ranges of patience. In all but one game, the more patient agent receives
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his second worst reward possible, the more impatient one, the best reward
possible. For the resource, the outcome is moderate as in all resulting games,
the more patient agent chooses restraint and the impatient one chooses no-
restraint. In the remaining game, the more patient one still receives his
second worst reward, yet the more impatient one the second-best reward.
The resource is fully exploited and the long term sh stock will be at their
technically feasible minimum level.
As a sensitivity analysis we examine the robustness of results with respect
to changes in the parameters concerning the resource stock dynamics. Next
to an a¢ rmative answer to this robustness question, interesting stylized
facts have been found. Summarizing them, it seems that the more reactive
the system is to overshing at the sh stock maximum level, the earlier
the agents come to their senses and equilibrium behavior leads to more
sustainable outcomes.4 By earlier, we mean that the favorable changes of the
discounted game occur at lower levels of  or higher levels of D. Assuming
the agentstime preferences to be drawn from a given distribution, chances
for the resource improve. An explanation is that the more near future payo¤s
are similar to the ones obtained at present, the more the discounted games
resemble the present stage game.
To give the reader an idea about the generalizability of our endeavours,
we examine a Stag Hunt in full. We investigate the set of possible discounted
games which may arise from a Stag Hunt in a Small Fish War, and obtain
a small universe of games. For su¢ ciently symmetric time preferences, this
universe consists of eight games, only one of which is a PrisonersDilemma.
The eight games are connected by non-degenerate, symmetric and admissible
transitions in structure. We call the original Stag Hunt the starting game
and one of the other games the end game. From the starting game, ten
paths emanate to end games and it is situation-dependent which path is
relevant given the dynamics of the resource. The more interesting paths
contain several transitions, the largest number of them being four, i.e., one
more than in the example studied. The largest number of paths connecting
the same starting and ending games is three.
This universe arising from the Stag Hunt has acceptable complexity,
yet dropping for instance symmetry makes the universe expand enormously.
For this situation a complete overview must be regarded as unworkable. We
have therefore two recommendations for practical purposes. To focus on one
particular resource game and examine it in full as we did in our example
for expository purposes. The second recommendation is to look only at the
changes relevant in a game-theoretical sense, as these total at most two, and
perhaps more importantly, they are the changes relevant to the question
whether the resource will be sustainable or not in equilibrium. The rst
4See e.g., Steg [2003] for an overview of explanations beyond our mathematical tech-
nicalities.
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neglects other games possibly arising from the same setting, the second one
neglects information about interesting social dilemma.
Next, we recall the small Fish War. Section 3 presents several social
dilemmas to be obtained in our model of technology choice in a Small Fish
War by both exponential and hyperbolic discounting. We perform a sensi-
tivity analysis in Section 4. Section 5 extends the analysis shown by means
of example in Section 3. Section 5 concludes.
2 Fishing in a vulnerable environment
The Small Fish War is played by players A and B at discrete moments in
time called stages. Each player has two actions and each stage each player
independently and simultaneously chooses an action. We denote the action
set of player A (B) by JA = f0; 1g (= JB) and J  JA  JB: Action 1
for either player denotes the action without or with very little restraint,
e.g., catching with ne-mazed net or catching a high quantity. Action 0
denotes the action where there exists some restriction, i.e., catching with
wide-mazed nets or catching a low quantity. The payo¤s at stage t0 2 N
of the play depend on the choices of the players at that stage, and on the
relative frequencies with which all actions were actually chosen until then.
Let hAt0 =
 
jA1 ; :::; j
A
t0 1

be the sequence of actions chosen by player A
until stage t0  2 , let hBt0 =
 
jB1 ; :::; j
B
t0 1

be dened similarly and let q  0.
Then, dene the rate of overshing t recursively for t  t0 by
1 =  2 [0; 1] ; and t =
q + t  1
q + t
t 1 +
1
q + t
 
jAt 1 + jBt 1
2
!
: (1)
Taking q  0 serves to moderate earlye¤ects. Note that for the long run
rate of overshing the choice of numbers  and q is irrelevant.
At stage t 2 N, the normalized sh stock t is given by
t  1 + (1 m)

n2
n1   n2 
n1
t  
n1
n1   n2 
n2
t

; (2)
where m 2 [0; 1] represents the minimal stock due to overexploitation by the
agents, and n1 > n2 > 1: So, Eq. (2) determines how the sh stock evolves
due to shing without restraint.
At each stage a bi-matrix game is played, and the choices of the players
at that stage determine their stage payo¤s. Let
A = B> =

a b
c d

: (3)
Then, for given t 2 [0; 1] at stage t 2 N, the stage payo¤s are given by
at; at bt; ct
ct; bt dt; dt

: (4)
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Here, t may be interpreted as a measure for the present sh stock; if player
A chooses action 0 and B chooses action 1; As stage payo¤ is bt and Bs
is ct:We assume that shing without restraint yields a higher catch in any
current stage than shing with restraint, hence a < c; b < d. We assume that
two-sided catching without restraint yields higher immediate payo¤s than
two-sided catching with restraint, i.e., a < d. Finally, we assume that the
player catching without restraint is better o¤ than his opponent if the latter
catches with restraint, hence b < c: The unique stage-game equilibrium is
the strategy pair in which both players use action 1.
Observe that for m = 1, we have a standard repeated game. The part
between the brackets determines the sensitivity of the sh stock to over-
exploitation. For increasing n1, the deterioration of the sh stock near its
maximum, is less and less noticeable; as a consequence the descent later on
must be steeper, the collapse of the sh stock is very rapid indeed. Below,
(2) is visualized for m = 0:1; n2 = n1   1; and di¤erent values of n1; the
greater n1, the higher the corresponding curve. For the six lower curves n1
lies between 2:2 and 5; the highest curve has n1 = 100: For the latter value
of n1, noticeable e¤ects on the sh stock are to be found when e.g., both
agents sh without restraint for approximately 90% of the time.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
If both agents never show restraint, then their associated long run stage
payo¤s are dm; under perfect restraint, their long run stage payo¤s equal
a: For large n1; n2 unrestrained shing can go on for quite a while without
having a noticeable e¤ect on the environment. Conversely, for n1  n2 or
xed n1 and n2 # 1, the environment is extremely sensitive.
The setting is supposed to be similar to a social trap. For the parameters
of the model we therefore arrive at yet another restriction. In words, the
continued use of the dominant action by both agents in the stage game,
namely to catch without restraint, leads to a situation in which the sh
stock deteriorates to such a level that the use of this action yields a pair of
immediate payo¤s which are lower than the alternative would have provided
the latter would have been used at all preceding stage games. A restriction
which takes care of this aspect is a > dm:
The agents are assumed to choose one of two catching technologies. One
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technology is harmless to the sh stock and the associated immediate catches
can be sustained forever; the other one is harmful to the sh stock but yields
(in every situation) a higher immediate catch than the alternative, in the
long run the catches might deteriorate signicantly. As an example of a
catching technology one may think of a type of a boat, an engine, or some
shing gear. Crucial is that it is assumed that the technology chosen can not
be replaced in a reasonable amount of time, or that it is so expensive that it
is not feasible to possess the alternative simultaneously and the associated
investments are sunk and can not be recovered.
As mentioned in the introduction this assumption of a once and for all
technology choice simplies the analysis. We only need to consider so-called
simple pure strategies, i.e.,  (i) = (i; i; i; :::) and  (j) = (j; j; j; :::) for
i; j 2 f0; 1g: Randomization over these strategies is allowed in the sense
that the adoption of a simple pure strategy might be thought of as being
preceded by randomization by one agent or both.
3 Social dilemmas and discounting
In the literature on social dilemmas (cf., e.g., Komorita & Parks [1994],
Heckathorn [1996]) bi-matrix games of the following types
';' ;  
 ;  !; !

are frequently studied where we may have:
  > '; ! > ; and ' > !; i.e., the P(risoners) D(ilemma);
  > '; ! < ; and ' > !; i.e., the CH(icken Game);
  < '; ! < ; and ' > !; i.e., the P(rivileged) G(ame).
  < ! <  < '; i.e., the S(tag) H(unt).
In the social dilemmas literature, the PrisonersDilemma takes a very promi-
nent role. In the PD-terminologythe left (top) action denotes to cooper-
ateand the alternative to defect. The payo¤s have names of their own as
well. In the PD  is called the T(emptation), ' is called C(ooperation),
! is P(unishment)and  is S(ucker reward). Sometimes the (abbrevia-
tions of the) names of the payo¤s and actions are transferred to other social
dilemmas, or even to games having even less in common with the PD.
The salient feature of a PD is that it possesses a unique Nash equilibrium
in dominant pure strategies, but there exists another pair of pure strategies
which Pareto-dominates the Nash equilibrium, yet is not an equilibrium it-
self. A Chicken Game has two pure Nash equilibria in which both players
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anti-coordinate on their pure actions. An SH has two pure Nash equilibria in
which both players coordinate their pure actions, and the Pareto-dominant
Nash equilibrium is riskier than the Pareto-inferior one. To help the dis-
cussion, let (sD; sD) be the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium and (sI ; sI)
be the Pareto-inferior one. Suppose that one agent plays sD expecting that
the other plays the strategy sD. If the rst player is mistaken, he receives
the lowest payo¤ possible. Choosing sI instead guarantees a higher amount
regardless of the opponents action.
The structure relevant for a game-theoretical analysis of these games
depends on '    and    !: What makes it a social dilemma however, is
that ' > !, i.e., if all agents cooperate, the associated payo¤s are higher
than if all defect (cf., e.g., Schelling [1978], Liebrand [1983], Dawes [1980]).
The PrisonersDilemma is due to Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher and
received its name and famous interpretative anecdote by Albert Tucker (cf,
e.g., Campbell [1985, p.3], Poundstone [1992]). The name Chicken Game
appeared rst in Kahn [1965], an alternative term for such a game is Snow-
drift (cf., e.g., Skyrms [1996], Sigmund [2010]). The name Privileged Game
is due to Heckathorn [1996] inspired by Olson [1965]. The Stag Hunt can
be traced back to at least Rousseau [1755], though Skyrms [2001] quotes
Hobbes [1651] and Hume [1739] as earlier examples of the same kind. A
Stag Hunt is sometimes called an Assurance Game (Sen [1967], Heckathorn
[1996]) or a Trust Game (Liebrand [1983]).
In the following two subsections we show that one and the same resource
may induce di¤erent games associated with di¤erent levels of patience of the
agents. Please keep in mind that the objective situation is taken predeter-
mined, only the perception of the agents regarding to which game they are
playing changes in response to their patience. In this respect there is some
analogy to an approach in Skyrms [2001], where a PrisonersDilemma is
repeatedly played and the innite repetition of the same one-shot PD is
evaluated as a Stag Hunt by adding a punishment strategy for each player.
Though intellectually indebted to contributions from e.g., Heckathorn
[1996], Dudley & Witt [2004], Dudley [2000], where also several social dilem-
mas arise from one meta-game, it should be noted that these di¤erent games
are to be regarded as stage games, arising through time as a result of choices
made in the past. In our paper, we have one objective resource game, ad-
mittedly consisting of an array of stage games resulting from actual historic
choices. However, we have also a multitude of subjective games at the deci-
sion point caused by the manner in which agents evaluate future payo¤s.
Here the top (left) action is to choose the strategy which allows full
recovery of the sh stock, whereas the alternative is to choose the one which
causes the sh stocks to decrease from maximum level.
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3.1 Exponential discounting
In economics, exponential discounting is a widespread and fairly standard
method to compare streams of payo¤s distributed over several distinct stages.
Contrastingly, there is also a strand of the literature considering long-term
average payo¤s which is deemed particularly useful for environmental con-
siderations (see e.g., Schelling [1995], Heal [1998], Weitzman [1998, 2001]).
Our earlier Small Fish Wars used the so-called limiting average reward cri-
terion for analysis. Though theoretically possible, cf., e.g., Fudenberg &
Maskin [1986], it is very cumbersome to obtain tangible results similar to
the ones presented in e.g., Joosten et al. [2003], Joosten [2007a,b,c] for the
unrestricted case.5 However, due to our assumption that each agent must
choose one technology for the entire game, the repeated game can be reduced
to a one-shot game by discounting the stream of future stage payo¤s.
Given strategy pair (; ) and  2 [0; 1); player ks -discounted
rewards, k = A;B; are given by k (; ) = (1   )
P1
t=1 
t 1Rkt (; ) :
The part before the summation sign is a normalization which guarantees
that a constant stream of payo¤s of say a is evaluated as a: A low (high)
 means that the agent is motivated by short (long) term considerations in
evaluating the stream of stage payo¤s. Less formally stated, a high (low) 
may be associated with (im)patient agents (cf., e.g., Koopmans [1960]).
Next, we consider the family of matrices depending on the discount factor
'; '  ;  
 ;  ! ; !

;
where we dene ' = 
1
 ((0); (0)) = 
2
 ((0); (0)) ;   = 
1
 ((1); (0))
= 2 ((0); (1)) ;  = 
1
 ((0); (1)) = 
2
 ((1); (0)), and nally ! =
1 ((1); (1)) = 
2
 ((1); (1)) :
Below, we visualize e¤ects  on the structure of the game.6
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5E¢ cient algorithms to obtain large sets of feasible -discounted rewards are lacking.
6To save computing time the innite sum was cut o¤ after t = 250; m = 0; n1 = 3;
n2 = 2; q = 5; a = 4; b =
7
2
, c = 6, d = 11
2
:
9
The blue-green curve represents '   !; let us refer to the value where it
intersects the -axis as left: The black curve represents  !; it intersects
the -axis at middle: The red curve represents '    ; it intersects the -
axis at right: For  > left we have a social dilemma., i.e., the socially
defective choice is Pareto dominated by the socially cooperative one. For
 > middle bottom-right can never be associated with an equilibrium. For
 > right top-left is turned into an equilibrium. We now can give the
following overview regarding the time preferences using ordinal ranking as
in Guyer & Rapoport [1966], where 4 denotes the highest utility, 1 lowest.
 Very impatient   < left : The corresponding matrix is
MV V =

2; 2 1; 4
4; 1 3; 3

:
Each player has a dominant action, namely to defect; the socially
defective choice induces an equilibrium which Pareto-dominates the
socially cooperative one. Hence, the game is not even a social dilemma.
The sh stock will be depleted maximally, i.e., limt!1 t = m:
 Impatient  left <  < middle : The corresponding matrix is
MII =

3; 3 1; 4
4; 1 2; 2

:
Here, the unique Nash equilibrium is no restraint for both agents. So,
there is little hope of reconciling the agentsinterests with sustainabil-
ity of the sh stock in this PrisonersDilemma. The sh stock will be
depleted, i.e., limt!1 t = m unless the agents solve the dilemma.
 Moderately patient  middle <  < right : The associated matrix is
MMM =

3; 3 2; 4
4; 2 1; 1

:
In this Chicken Game, in each pure Nash equilibrium one agent always
catches with restraint, the other without. The long run sh stock can
be computed easily as limt!1 t =
1
2 for the parameters chosen. There
is a contradiction between self-interest and sustainability, though less
severe than in the preceding case. A complicating factor here is in-
equality: one agent receives his best and the other his next to worst
outcome. Another complication here is coordination: which agent will
be the one receiving his best outcome? There is also a mixed Nash
equilibrium in every CH depending crucially on the actual numbers of
the four utilities instead of their ordinal ranking.
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 Patient   > right : The corresponding matrix is
MPP =

4; 4 2; 3
3; 2 1; 1

:
In this Privileged Game, the agents care for high long-term yields. The
sh stock remains at maximum level and limt!1 t = 1: So, there is
no contradiction between self-interest and sustainability.
The subscripts P , M , I and V indicate that the discounting parameter be-
longs to the range patient, moderately patient, impatient and very impatient
respectively. Here, the rst (second) capital denotes the range to which the
discount parameter of player 1 (2) belongs.
The analysis can be adapted to incorporate asymmetric time preferences.
The actual levels for the discounting parameters are irrelevant, only the
ranges matter. If both discount parameters belong to the same range, the
overview above applies. The matrices relevant for the asymmetric time-
preferences case are the following
MPM =

4; 3 2; 4
3; 2 1; 1

; MPI =

4; 3 2; 4
3; 1 1; 2

; MPV =

4; 2 2; 4
3; 1 1; 3

;
MMI =

3; 3 2; 4
4; 1 1; 2

; MMV =

3; 2 2; 4
4; 1 1; 3

; MIV =

3; 2 1; 4
4; 1 2; 3

;
Recall that this implies that the row player is the more patient one. In
the matrices above, a star denotes equilibrium rewards. MPM ; MPI and
MMI are also social dilemmas as the socially defective outcome is Pareto
dominated by the socially cooperative one. MMI is called a Bully Game in
Poundstone [1992] where we suspect a typo occurred, or Called Blu¤(Snyder
& Diesing [1977]). The actual game appearing in Poundstone [1992] isMMV ,
a Big Bully Game in Bennet [1998], but this game is not a social dilemma.
Joosten [2005] introduces a Hillel game which has a dominance structure
similar toMPM in the following sense. Player A (B) would like his opponent
to play the rst action because this would yield higher (own) payo¤s than
the alternative. But in a Hillel game, the Golden Rule7 induces a Nash
equilibrium which is Pareto optimal. An alternative way of looking at such
a game is to alter the utilities of the agents, each agent tries to maximize
his opponents payo¤s as in Kelley & Thibaut [1978]. Despite signicant
similarities with a Hillel game, MPM is di¤erent as the Golden Rule does
not yield an equilibrium at all.
In all but one matrix the top-right entry is the unique Nash equilibrium
reward corresponding to the strategy pair cooperate-defect; in the remaining
7There are several versions of this rule. The best known ones are: Do unto others as
you would like them to do unto youand Do not do unto others as you would not like
them to do unto you. The rst is attributed to Jesus of Nazareth, the second to Hillel.
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one defect-defect is a Nash equilibrium. Hence, the more patient agent
obtains the second-worst outcome while the other gets the best one except
in one case in which he gets the second best.8
3.2 Hyperbolic discounting
In behavioral and experimental economics communities hyperbolic discount-
ing introduced by Phelps & Pollack [1968] is often seen as more appropri-
ate to describe behavior (cf., e.g., Ainslie [1974,1975] Ainslie & Herrnstein
[1981]).9 For instance, persistently recurring anomalies in intertemporal
choice can be explained better with hyperbolic than with exponential dis-
counting (cf., e.g., Strotz [1952], Rachlin [1970], Rachlin & Green [1972],
Loewenstein & Prelec [1992], Loewenstein & Thaler [1998]). If this criticism
regarding exponential discounting were found to be valid, then the previous
analysis is clearly not su¢ cient. Therefore, we decided to incorporate the
alternative of hyperbolic discounting in a Small Fish War.10
For our purposes we normalize the total discounted rewards in such a
manner that a stream of constant payo¤s amounts to exactly that amount.
Hence, we say given strategy pair (; ) and D  0; the D-discounted
rewards of player k, k = A;B; are given by
kD (; ) = lim
T!1
 
TX
t=1
1
1 +D(t  1)
! 1 TX
t=1
1
1 +D(t  1)R
k
t (; ) ;
where the part
PT
t=1
1
1+D(t 1)
 1
is a normalization guaranteeing that an
innite stream of constant payo¤s yield a discounted reward exactly equal
to this constant; we take the limit as
P1
t=1
1
1+D(t 1) is ill-dened. Note that
the smaller D the more patient the agent.
Similar to the approach for exponential discounting, we consider the
family of matrices depending on the type of discounting
'D; 'D D;  D
 D; D !D; !D

;
where for instance 'D = 
1
D ((0); (0)) = 
2
D ((0); (0)) and the other pa-
rameters are computed similarly mutatis mutandis. To produce the diagram
8 In a Fish War o¤Newfoundland, a deal between Canada and Spain was struck in which
Canadian shermen received quota which were lower than in an earlier agreement broken
by the Spanish. A real world example of the patient being exploited by the impatient?
Another example can be found in Kennedy [1987, p.7] where the Australian government
considered lowering Australian quota in case Japanese catch was not curtailed su¢ ciently,
this being deemed in the interest of Australia itself.
9 I thank Christian Cordes for reminding me of this fact.
10Note that Rubinstein [2003] observes that the criticism leading to a rejection of stan-
dard constant discount utility functions can easily reject hyperbolic discounting as well.
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below we computed for di¤erent values of D  0 the same three numbers
namely 'D !D (in blue); 'D  D (in black) and D !D (in red).11 Recall
that the more patient agent has a lower parameter D.
The results for hyperbolic discounting are quite comparable to the results
for exponential discounting. Let us call the intersection point of the blue-
green curve with the horizontal axis Dright; the corresponding point for the
black curve Dmiddle; and the intersection point of the red curve Dleft:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-1
0
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y
We can now give the following overview with respect to D  0:
 Very impatient (D > Dright) : The corresponding matrix is MV V .
Each player has a dominant action, namely to defect; the socially
defective choice induces an equilibrium which Pareto-dominates the
socially cooperative one. The sh stock will be depleted.
 Impatient (Dmiddle < D < Dright) : The corresponding matrix is MII :
There is little hope of reconciling the agents interests with sustain-
ability of the sh stock in this PD. The sh stock will be depleted (in
all likelihood).
 Moderately patient (Dleft < D < Dmiddle) : The corresponding matrix
is MMM . In this CH, it is optimal that one agent always catches with
restraint, while the other one catches without. The long run sh stock
can be computed easily as  = 12 .
 Patient (D < Dleft) : The corresponding matrix is MPP . In the re-
sulting PG, the agents care for high long-term yields and therefore for
high long-term sh stocks. Hence, there is no contradiction between
self-interest and sustainability.
11To speed up computations, we used several nite evaluation periods T (instead of1):
For T = 50; 75; 100; 150 qualitatively similar diagrams were obtained.
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As the reader may conrm, the same types of social dilemmas appear for the
same ranges of patience. Again, the matrices relevant for the asymmetric
time-preferences case are MPM , MPI , MPV , MMI , MMV and MIV . For
space considerations, we refer to the previous section for details regarding
those 6 matrices.
Remark 1 Details regarding the type of discounting do matter in practice,
for instance, where precisely intersection points of the three curves are (if
there exists one). Both methods of evaluating the future may give conicting
answers as to which games are possible, e.g., we have constructed examples
in which a curve intersects the horizontal axis in exponential discounting,
while its hyperbolic counterpart does not. However, both types of discounting
allow the same type of conceptual analysis.
Remark 2 A whole range of games may arise in one and the same common
pool resource game due to di¤erent degrees of patience on the part of the
agents. This range may very well contain the PD as a special case, but also
e.g., the CH, PG or the Bully Game. Moreover, we found that not every
game possible is a social dilemma.
Remark 3 Monotonicity with respect to  (D) of any curve ' !;  !
or '     ('D   !D; D   !D or 'D    D) implies that such a curve
intersects the -axis at most once.
4 The resource and behavior
We generated an example which seems not too far o¤ from some other work
both from empirics and theory with respect to which predictions can be
made under which levels of patience. In a theoretical model analyzing opti-
mal management of North Sea herring, Maroto & Moran [2008] nd a simi-
lar relationship between patience and sustainability. Discount factors below
0:71, i.e., great impatience in our terminology, lead to rationalovershing
and extinction; discount factors between 0:72 and 0:85, i.e., impatience, in-
duce periodical irting with extinction and return to high sh stock levels
is unlikely; for discount factors between 0:86 and 0:94; i.e., moderate im-
patience, extinction is less likely, yet full recovery is unlikely as well; only
lower discount factors induce sustainability.
Bjørndal [1988] shows for the North Sea herring shery that a discount
rate above 0.53 (  0:65, i.e., a high degree of impatience) implies the
tragedyas an optimaloutcome, whereas a rate below 0.12 (  0:89, i.e.,
a high degree of patience) induces high sh stocks and corresponding high
sustainable landings.
Hillis & Wheelan [1994] report discount rates of shermen (and political
institutions) between 0.25 (  0:80) and 0.40 (  0:71). In the numerical
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example of our model, this qualies as impatient, with one extreme value
very close to very impatient and the other one rather close to moderately im-
patient. This would place the discounted games in the range of a Prisoners
Dilemma (MII) with the extremes close to MV V and MMM (a CH).
4.1 Reactivity of the resource system
We see eight parameters in the case analyzed in the previous section, namely,
a; b; c; d (PS)
n1; n2; q;m (RS)
PS denotes the parameters pertaining to the payo¤ structure, and RS to
the resource system. Having eight parameters governing several equations
linking the various relationships, one might get lost which parameter causes
which e¤ect. We will come back to the complexity of the model in Section 5.
However, we made one striking observation with respect to the parameters
in RS and we devote the remainder of this section to it.
To generate the diagram for the discounting case below, we only in-
creased the minimal sh stock, i.e., m = 0:1: The diagram should be com-
pared to the diagram in Subsection 3.1.
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Qualitatively, this diagram is similar to the one corresponding to the case for
the lower-level minimal sh stock,m = 0; but there is a noticeable di¤erence.
First, left moves to the right. So, the very worst conditions on the game
change to the second worst, i.e., the PD, only for a higher value (left) of
the discounting parameter. This e¤ect is exemplary for the other changes.
The PD transforms into the CH at a higher value (middle), and the latter
one into the PG at a higher value (right).
There are two other parameter constellations inuencing the speed in
which the system reacts to overshing at high resource stock levels. One
parameter is q, where a high value means that the (early) e¤ects of unre-
strained shing on the sh stock are more damped. The other one depends
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on the interplay between n1 and n2: If both decrease while keeping their
di¤erence xed, the system becomes more reactive. We have examined the
e¤ects of these constellations on the functions and graphs used for analysis
in the preceding section, and we found that a higher (lower) q and higher
(lower) n1 and n2 while keeping n1   n2 = 1 cause the three curves in the
graph to shift to the right (left).
For hyperbolic discounting we checked the same three e¤ects in isolation,
i.e., changes in minimal sh stock m, changes in the damping parameter q
and changes in n1 and n2. In all three cases mentioned the curves changed
in the direction expected, i.e., in the opposite direction of the movements of
the corresponding curves in the exponential discounting case. For the sake
of brevity we only present the three curves belonging to the case where the
minimal sh stock is increased to m = 0:1. Note that all intersection points
move to the left.
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How are these observations to be interpreted? The reason for the shifts
mentioned seems that if the consequences of catching without restraint, i.e.,
by the use of the technology harmful to the resource, are felt earlier by the
agents because the resource system reacts more quickly, or more strongly,
then the thresholds relevant for our analysis concerning the discounting pa-
rameters occur at lower levels. This gives the following insight.
Remark 4 The more (less) reactive the sh stock due to overshing in the
high sh-stock-levels range, the lower (higher) the discount parameters for
which the agents come to their senses.
Chances for sustainability worsen for shifts to the right if one assumes the
discount parameter  to be drawn from some xed distribution. Let for
instance  be uniformly distributed on the interval found by Hillis & Whee-
lan [1994], i.e., the interval [0:71; 0:8] : Assuming perfectly symmetric time-
preferences, in the original setting game most likely to be played is a Pris-
onersDilemma, but the left boundary of the interval is close to MV V and
the right one is not very far from MMM , which corresponds to a Chicken
16
Game. A shift to the right of all curves implies there now exists a positive
probability that the game played is MV V ; hence the new situation is to be
regarded as worse than before the shift. Contrary, a su¢ ciently large shift to
the left would induce a positive probability of a CH being played, improving
the chances for sustainability considerably.
4.2 The state of the resource
Remark 4 suggests a potential for framing in the sense used in behavioral
economics (Kahneman & Tversky [1984], & Tversky Kahneman & Tver-
sky [1981,1986], Schelling [1984]), i.e., to communicate the most pessimistic
scenarios. The graver the problem is perceived, the more likely the agents
behave in the interest of sustainability, cf., e.g., Joosten [2007b]. The follow-
ing caveat is to be kept in mind. Hillis & Wheelan [1994] attribute the (in
their view) impatience of shermen to the great uncertainty the latter per-
ceive about future landings (see also Döring [2006]).12 Several factors may
contribute to (perceived) uncertainty in a real-world common pool resource
system, for instance stochastic resource dynamics, weather or climatic con-
ditions, spatial aspects, Allee e¤ects, the number of agents, legal and insti-
tutional settings of the resource system in isolation or even in combination.
In a system close to exhaustion the future might be more heavily discounted
(receive a much lower weight), than in a system in which the resource is
available at maximum capacity.13 This would complicate any mission to-
wards recovery to high sh stocks considerably, or alternatively, aggravate
the danger of exhaustion enormously.
In the contributions mentioned, Irish See shermen are called impa-
tient. A benchmark for patience clearly is lacking. If discount rates of
25% to 40% of Irish See shermen are compared to the long-term risk-
free interest rates on the capital market (well below 10%), then indeed
they may be called impatient. However, recent work suggests that their
time-preferences14 might not be too far o¤ from those of people in other
12See Deutsch [1978] for one psychological interpretation, namely the scepticism that
goodown behavior will lead to the desired outcome. Dawes [1980] and Edney [1980, 1981]
o¤er another, namely the expectation of nonreciprocation of cooperative behavior (cf., e.g.,
Brann & Foddy [1987]). Trust might be an issue too, cf., e.g., Messick et al. [1983], Brann
& Foddy [1987]. Döring & Egelkraut [2008] suggest that shermens long-term uncertainty
should be reduced to avert the threat of aggressive short-term behavior. Bjørndal &
Gordon [1993] observe investment behavior in the Norwegian shing eet even under low
rates of return suggesting an absence or reduction risk due to the nature of the shery
at hand (cf., e.g., Boncoeur et al. [2000] and Edney & Harper [1978]). Hannesson [1997]
defends a discount rate between 5-10% in case the number of competitors is particularly
low which induces cooperation (see also Komorita & Parks [1996] on analogous ndings).
13 In our model, this might imply that we would have variable s (or Ds) depending on
the level of the present sh stock, i.e., t = f (t) (or Dt = g (t)) with f nonincreasing
(g nondecreasing) in the argument.
14We are aware of the criticism spelled out in the overview of Frederick et al. [2002].
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professions or positions (cf., e.g., Warner & Pleeter [2001]15 or Harrison et
al. [2002]16).
5 Generalizability
To demonstrate the generalizability of the approach, we analyze a dilemma
characterized by an interaction matrix given by (3) with c < a < b < d;
i.e., a Stag Hunt or Assurance Game (cf., e.g., Skyrms [2004], Sen [1967]]).
This structure might arise here if the environmentally harmful technology
has strong positive externalities with itself and mild externalities with the
other, while being very costly in operating. So, if both players happen to
choose that technology, the benets outweigh the costs by far in every stage
game. However, if only one player chooses this technology and the other one
does not, then high costs are borne by the former but insu¢ cient benets
come in to compensate. So, this technology can be viewed as very risky,
both the highest and the lowest one-shot payo¤s are associated to it.
However, we are not merely interested in the stage games associated
with the resource game, we are interested in the discounted rewards of the
game which are subject to two di¤erent simultaneous e¤ects. Firstly, the
sh stock deteriorates as time progresses if the environmentally damaging
technology is adopted; the more adopters the quicker the stock goes down.
Secondly, the manner in which the agents discount has inuences the same
type of matrix di¤erently for each entry.
For the discussion to follow, let us dene the following family of matrices
and describe the connections between them. The reason is that as in the
analysis presented in Section 3, we construct a sequence of relevant matrices
following from increasing patience on the part of the agents.
M1 =

2; 2 3; 1
1; 3 4; 4

; M2 =

3; 3 2; 1
1; 2 4; 4

; M3 =

4; 4 2; 1
1; 2 3; 3

;
M4 =

4; 4 3; 1
1; 3 2; 2

; M5 =

4; 4 3; 2
2; 3 1; 1

; M6 =

2; 2 4; 1
1; 4 3; 3

;
M7 =

3; 3 4; 1
1; 4 2; 2

; M8 =

3; 3 4; 2
2; 4 1; 1

:
In the matrices above, a star denotes a pair of rewards associated with an
equilibrium. So, the rst three games have two equilibria, full-restraint or
So, it is not wise to attribute too much condence even to these results.
15They report estimated discount rates of 0.104 for o¢ cers in the US army around 1992,
and 0.354 for enlisted personnel (later corrected to 0.173), well below the lower bound in
Hillis & Wheelan [1994], yet above the o¢ cersrates.
16Reporting a 90% condence interval of [0.2726,0.2903] for discount rates of the general
public in Denmark.House owners (0.2561) and non-owners (0.3167), less educated (0.3098)
and more educated (0.2059), skilled (0.2573) and unskilled (0.3143) di¤er.
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full-exploitation; the other ones only one, full-restraint. M1 andM2 are Stag
Hunts, M3 is not. In the remaining ve games the choice of the sustainable
technology dominates the alternative. Hence, in those games game theory
predicts full-restraint and sustainable sh stocks at maximum level. Note
however, that M6 is a PrisonersDilemma.
Observe that M2 can be obtained by switching the spots of ordinal utili-
ties 2 and 3 inM1. We will call such a transition from one to another matrix
involving at most two consecutive relative utilities (for each player) as non-
degenerate. Note that M3 can be obtained from M1 by two non-degenerate
transitions (via M2); but that the direct transition is degenerate. A tran-
sition is symmetric if the same changes occur for both players. Again the
transition from M1 to M2 is a symmetric one, because for both players the
2 and 3 exchange their places.
A sequence of transitions is admissible in the present framework if they
satisfy the following properties.
 The relative ordering of the o¤-diagonal entries do not change.
 Each top-left entry can never decrease and each bottom-right entry
can never increase.
To illustrate the rst point of admissibility, observe the top-right entry in
M1 has entry (3; 1) and the left-bottom entry is (1; 3) : So, for Player 1 the
top-right reward is better than the bottom-left reward. Matrix M2 can be
obtained from M1 by an admissible transition. Observe now that again for
Player 1 the top-right reward, i.e., 2; is better than the bottom-left reward,
i.e., 1. The bottom-right entries did not change and both top-left entries
increased. Hence, the transition is admissible.
The following overview represents the universecreated by all possible
non-degenerate, symmetric, admissible matrices emanating from M1
M2 ! M3 ! M4 ! M5
% % %
M1  ! M6 ! M7 ! M8
5.1 The resource games for increasing patience
The crucial point now is to establish where a sequence begins and where
it ends in this little universe. There may be little surprise that any se-
quence starts in M1 but it is not trivial where such a sequence ends. For
instance, if m = 1 or alternatively if this lower bound for the sh stock is
su¢ ciently high, the sequence may start and terminate in the same matrix.
We determine the terminating matrix by looking at17
Mend =

'1; '1 1;  1
 1; 1 !1; !1

:
17For the sake of brevity, we only refer to the exponential discounting approach.
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As both players have symmetric time-preferences, one of the matrices above
is a candidate as an end matrix for the sequence of transitions, but only one
qualies depending on the entire set of parameters of the resource system.
Now, suppose Mend = M8; then a unique sequence exists from M1 in-
volving three transitions, comparable in spirit to the sequence appearing in
Section 3. There are three critical s changing the structure of the game.
However, if Mend = M2, there exists only one transition for one : On the
other hand, if Mend = M4 or Mend = M5 multiple sequences of di¤erent
lengths exists. Here, the number of matrices in the sequence can be taken
as a measure of length. In the above, there exist two sequences of length 1,
two of length 2, three of length 3, and three sequences of length 4.
Observe furthermore that of the sequences leading to M5 one can be
regarded as more dangerous to the resource than the two others. There
exists one sequence M1 ! M2 ! M3 ! M4 ! M5; and two alternatives
containing M6: The former sequence requires two utility transitions caused
by increased patience on the part of the agents for the resource to be safe
from exhaustion, because only atM4 the game has the environmentally safe
outcome as its unique equilibrium. In the latter two sequences, already after
one transition caused by increased patience of the agents the resource may
be regarded as safe from exhaustion assuming rationality of agents and the
impossibility of making binding agreements.
5.2 Reducing complexity
Complexity of the case above is not too cumbersome and therefore it serves
to demonstrate the approach in full. However if we drop the requirement
of symmetry regarding the transitions matters become much more involved.
Even if we assume the starting and ending matrices to coincide for the case
of symmetric and asymmetric transitions, the number of sequences and the
number of matrices to be examined increase very quickly. Suppose in the
symmetric case we need just one transition from starting to ending matrix,
in the asymmetric case we already need two. Similarly, two symmetric
transitions require an analysis of six potential asymmetric ones; three induce
20, four induce 70. In that case the small universe might18 explode to a
universe with 286 games more.
The rst relief to the reader may come from the observation that for the
entire universe of possible transitions considerable e¤orts may be required
indeed, but for one specic setting matters are comparable to the e¤orts of
establishing an overview of the universe of transitions in Section 3.
Furthermore, we need not make a distinction between all eight matri-
ces in the analysis above, or the rapidly increasing number of matrices for
transitions. What is crucial is whether rational agents will use the envi-
18We did not check whether the 286 additions are unique, hence the might.
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ronmentally harmful technology in equilibrium. Recall that the structure
relevant for a game-theoretical analysis on the signs of '1  1 ; 1 !1 ;
'2    2 ; and 2   !2 : Hence, the total universe of game-theoretically
and sustainability-related relevant transitions consists of at most four.
For instance, M1; M2 and M3 have two pure Nash equilibria, hence sus-
tainability is endangered as one equilibrium involves the mutual choice of
the harmful technology. Furthermore, a third Nash equilibrium in mixed
strategies exists which we did not address in the above as we focus on pure
equilibria and on ordinal utilities. A mixed equilibrium still endangers the
resource as with positive probability both agents adopt the harmful tech-
nology. For the other matrices in the overview, the use of the harmful
technology is dominated by the use of the harmless one. Hence, by struc-
turing the analysis around the game-theoretically important transitions, an
enormous reduction in complexity is achieved regarding the total overview,
and for specic cases analysis is less involved anyway.
6 Conclusions and discussion
In earlier work on Small Fish Wars (Joosten [2007a,b,c]) we used the average
reward criterion for a number of reasons. One being that the average re-
ward criterion leads to a consistent mapping for given behavior of what the
common-pool resource yields in the long run and how the agents evaluate
their revenues. Furthermore, it is evident that under discounting, any im-
mediate advantage seems to be preferred to any environmental or economic
catastrophe su¢ ciently far away in the future, cf., e.g., Heal [1998], Weitz-
man [1998, 2001]. Schelling [1995] stresses that discounting is appropriate
within a generation, not between generations, see also e.g., Rabl [1996]. The
standard interpretation of using the average reward criterion is that agents
are very patient, i.e., future payo¤s are equivalent to current ones.
Here, we study the situation in which patience is nite, agents value a
payo¤ now di¤erently from the same payo¤ in the future, i.e., they prefer a
payo¤now to the same in the future. We therefore analyze a Small Fish War
using exponential discounting and hyperbolic discounting, two of the most
common methods of comparing intertemporal payo¤s. Technology choice is
assumed a once-and-for-all decision, or alternatively for a su¢ ciently long
period of time. This may occur for instance, if technologies are expensive
and di¢ cult to get rid of, or involve large sunk or switching costs. Both
types of discounting allow a similar qualitative analysis.
In an example examined for expository purposes we nd for both that the
interaction of agents in a resource system induces several di¤erent subjec-
tivegames depending on the level of patience of the agents. For a group of
impatient, prot maximizing agents it might be perfectly rational to deplete
the sh stock completely and as quickly as possible.
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However, a tragedy of the commonsis not unavoidable as several other
scenarios may occur. For di¤erent ranges of patience and assuming suf-
ciently symmetric time-preferences, the games to occur are for instance,
a PrisonersDilemma (PD), a Chicken Game (CH) or a Privileged Game
(PG). Very impatient agents play a game endangering the resource, as equi-
librium behavior implies acceptance of the environmentally harmful tech-
nology. More patient agents play a PD and the problem here is only slightly
less grave, but rationaltechnology choice still favors the harmful one.
Considerably better prospects for the resource arise in the two other
games. Even more patient agents play a CH, a game with two equilibria.
In each equilibrium one agent uses the harmless technology, and the other
the harmful one. Both pure equilibria induce long run sh stocks below
maximum, but well above minimum stock level. The real problem here is
coordination, who will take which technology? The nal social dilemma is a
PG, which is good for the resource as equilibrium behavior implies mutual
choice of the environmentally sound technology.
Su¢ ciently asymmetric time-preferences yield an entirely di¤erent pic-
ture. In ve out of six games arising from the same example, the more pa-
tient agent chooses the harmless technology, whereas the opponent chooses
the harmful one. The less patient agent obtains the most favored outcome
in all of these ve cases, the patient one obtains the next to worst outcome
in all six cases. Again the e¤ects on the resource are moderate, full exhaus-
tion is curbed, yet the resource is not at its maximum stock either. In the
remaining game, both exploit the resource ruthlessly.
To demonstrate that the method of analysis can be applied universally,
we analyze another social dilemma, a Stag Hunt, in full. Instead of fo-
cussing on one particular setting, we examine all possible games which may
arise from this particular Stag Hunt in a Small Fish War under discounting.
Starting fairly cautiously by allowing only non-degenerate, symmetric and
admissible transitions, we nd a universeof eight of such games.
The dynamics of the resource determine a unique sequence of games
connecting the Stag Hunt with a so-called end game. Alternative sequences
may exist connecting the Stag Hunt and this end game, but only one is rele-
vant. The interpretation then is that the sequence represents the collection
of games arising by letting the agents become more and more patient as in
the example studied for expository purposes.
The general case proved to be very complex, as dropping symmetry
for instance, caused our eight-game universe to explode to more than 280
games. We recommend therefore to analyze only the transitions relevant
for game theoretical predictions which also constitute the relevant cases for
sustainability of the resource. Furthermore, we propose, if possible, to only
tackle well-described settings such that indeed a unique sequence of games
within this possibly very large universe is to be expected.
Elinor Ostrom and co-workers lament the indiscriminate use of three
22
metaphors ... to predict suboptimal use and/or destruction of the resource
(see Ostrom et al. [1994], and also Ostrom [1990]). The three inuential
metaphorical models meant are the tragedy of the commons, the Prison-
ersDilemma19 and the logic of collective action20. Equilibrium behavior
induces a situation to be regarded as inferior to a possibly non-equilibrium
alternative in the sense that had somebody dictated the latter, this would
be preferred by all. This describes a social dilemma.
Two frequently parroted theoretical solutions to common pool resource
problems are quite simplistic and even contradictory. One recommends a
Hobbesian Leviathan, i.e., a government with major coercive powers (cf.,
e.g., Ophuls [1973, p. 228], to induce the alternative preferred by all as the
only way(cf., Ostrom [1990]). The other proposes private property rights,
e.g., Demsetz [1967], Johnson [1972] as the only way, e.g., Smith [1981].
Remarkably, game theory has a hard time explaining the many non-
failing dilemmas collected by the Ostrom and cooperators. Much of this
groups work (e.g., Ostrom et al. [1994], Ostrom [1990,2005]) revolves
around the theme that a rich array of institutional settings can curb the
threat of the tragedy. Among the aspect that may be helpful in generating
favorable (pre)conditions for sustainable high extraction rates are communi-
cation, repeated interaction, monitoring, possible punitive actions, voluntary
rules, trust, various institutional designs.
To put our contribution into a perspective regarding the above. We have
shown that quite a few games may arise in the context of our model of a
specic common pool resource game. Some are PrisonersDilemmas, many
are not. Some have the characteristics of a tragedy of the commons, others
lead to a sustainable resource under equilibrium behavior.
Information is crucial in assessing the sustainability of a certain resource
under equilibrium behavior. Suppose we know everything about the resource
and the agents, then we know the exact game to be played. However, if we
have complete information regarding the resource, yet incomplete informa-
tion regarding the time-preferences of the agents involved, we must do with
a unique sequence of games, of which just one will be played. If we know the
current state of the resource and we possess information on what ruthless
exploitation can do to it in the end, yet can not entirely describe what hap-
pens in between, we must establish a possibly very large universe of games,
of which a unique one will be played, not known in advance.
This poses problems of increasing magnitude to a eld researcher as well
19Dawes [1973,1975] is reputed to be the rst scholar to show similarities between the
prisoners dilemma and the tragedy of the commons. Similarity does not imply equivalence
as many, e.g., Godwin & Shepard [1979], Kimber [1981], tried to demonstrate.
20Olson [1965, p.2] challenged communis opinio at that point in time that group benet
would inevitably trigger collective action to achieve that benet: unless there is coercion
or some other special devise to make individuals act in their common interest, rational
self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests.
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as to a benevolent21 authority examining whether or not to intervene in the
game or not by designing rules to be adhered to or alternatively by assigning
property rights. Which game will (most likely) be played? For a scientist
to judge whether or not observed behavior corresponds to equilibrium be-
havior or not, the game must be known. For this purpose, not only relevant
knowledge about the resource dynamics under (over)exploitation should be
available, but also about how the agents evaluate future payo¤s.
Perhaps the information on the part of the agents is better than the
information the authorities possess. So one might want to advise authorities
to keep out. However, even the agents themselves might not entirely know
the game to be played. For instance, if they know how they evaluate the
strategic interaction themselves, they might be lacking the knowledge about
the time preferences of their opponents. This might endanger the unenforced
installment of institutional settings to avoid the tragedy of the commons.
We also found equilibrium behavior which is not necessarily bad for sus-
tainability, the resource survives at considerable higher stock levels than
under full exploitation, yet equilibrium yields quite unegalitarian outcomes.
With the latter we mean that one agent receives a much more preferred
outcome than his opponent. We found this outcome in a Chicken Game set-
ting for su¢ ciently similar time-preferences, but rather frequently in games
arising under su¢ ciently dissimilar time-preferences. In almost all asym-
metric preference games, the more patient agent will be exploited by the
more impatient one. In the Chicken Game coordination is an issue, in the
former as well as in the latter games inequality is, both for the agents as it
complicates reaching agreements, or intervention by benevolent authorities.
Further research must show what the e¤ects of perverseprice-scarcity
dynamics for the present model(s) are. In a series of papers, Courchamp and
co-workers (c.f., e.g., Berec et al. [2006], Courchamp et al. [2006], Hall et al.
[2008]), have highlighted rarity value, a slightly counterintuitive mechanism
under which unit prices increase without a bound for increased scarcity of
the resource. Such a setting will in general aggravate the usual problems of a
common pool resource system. Once a species becomes scarce, its increased
value make the propensity to exploit it grow, which increases its scarcity
etc.
In earlier work (Joosten [2007b,c]), we hypothesized that we might ob-
serve such an e¤ect actually occurring: the blue n tuna. Prices of blue n
tuna have broken a considerable number of records in the past few years,
yet demand is not declining. We also showed that innite patience in the
presence of rarity value need not help at all in sustaining the resource. We
know that myopic time preferences do not help in general and that innite
patience is not helpful either. Perhaps intermediate ranges of patience may
21Benevolent as in wishing to do justiceto the agents as well as desiring to preserve
the resource with as little intervention as possible.
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lead to sustainable outcomes, but a full examination is still pending.
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